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Abstract   
Fundamental information resembles in many respects a durable good. Hence, the effects of its incorporation into 
stock prices depend on who is the agent controlling its flow. Similarly to a durable goods monopolist, a 
monopolistic analyst selling information intertemporally competes against herself. This forces her to partially 
relinquish control over the information flow to traders. Conversely, an insider solves the intertemporal 
competition problem through vertical integration, thus exerting a tighter control over the flow of information. 
Comparing market patterns I show that a dynamic market where information is provided by an analyst is thicker 
and more informative than one where an insider trades. 
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  Organized stock markets facilitate the exchange of assets among traders hence allow-
ing a ﬁrm’s fundamental information to be impounded into prices. There are mainly
two ways by which this occurs: either traders acquire information from a specialized
provider (e.g., an analyst), or they obtain it thanks to a particular relationship they
have with the ﬁrm (i.e. they are insiders). Far from being irrelevant, the way through
which information is gathered to the market dramatically aﬀects the characteristics
of stock prices. This paper shows that the dynamic properties of a market closely
depend on who is the agent exerting control over the ﬂow of information.
Fundamental information resembles in many respects a durable good. Indeed, a
trader holding a signal on a ﬁrm’s pay-oﬀ can use it during several trading rounds.
Also, as most durable goods, the value of such a signal depreciates as a result of its
use, due to price information transmission. However, diﬀerently from a durable good,
information cannot be rented. Therefore, the ability of its provider (be it an analyst or
an insider) to overcome the traditional self-competition problem (see Bulow (1982),
(1986), Coase (1972), and Waldman (1993)) directly impacts the properties of the
underlying asset market.
Consider an analyst selling information. As the durable goods monopolist – who
in order to extract consumer surplus may artiﬁcially shorten the life of the product she
sells – the analyst, after distributing a signal of a given quality is tempted to increase
the quality of the signals she sells in the periods to come. In particular, in a two-period
market, I show that once the ﬁrst signal has been sold to competitive traders, the
analyst distributes a new signal which, in order to be palatable to potential buyers,
must render partially “obsolete” the signal sold in the ﬁrst period. The seller thus
impoverishes the quality of the ﬁrst period information she sells (so to reduce the level
of its durability and weaken future self-competition), while consistently enhancing the
2one sold in the second period (so to force the ﬁrst period signal obsolescence). This,
in turn, attenuates the severity of the market makers’ adverse selection problem along
the two periods, implying a pattern of increasing market depth.
Consider now the case of an insider. Being the end-user of the information he
possesses enables him to choose the rate at which the market learns it. In particular,
as he directly exploits his informational advantage, he avoids the eﬀect of intertem-
poral self-competition, fully internalizes the negative eﬀect of aggressive speculation,
and trades less intensely.
The analyst thus acts in a way that is much akin to the durable goods monopolist
that, being forced to sell rather than rent, handles her intertemporal self-competition
problem strategically choosing the quality of the goods she markets; the insider, on
the other hand, attenuates competition through vertical integration: the producer
and the ﬁnal user of the information good, in his case, coincide. 1 Comparing market
patterns, the insider’s tighter control over the information ﬂow makes the market in
the second period thinner and prices less informative than those that obtain in the
analyst’s market. In a dynamic market, therefore, trading by an insider worsens stock
price accuracy and impairs market depth compared to a market where information is
provided by an analyst.
Several papers analyze dynamic trading in markets with asymmetric information
and assess the relevance of information ﬂows in determining the behavior of market
patterns. Yet, in all of these works the information ﬂow is either exogenously given,
as if traders were born endowed with their private signals, or determined by traders’
endogenous decisions to acquire signals of a given constant precision. 2 However, as
information is a valuable good, its distribution is likely to depend on the decisions of
agents who, given traders’ time-varying desire to become informed, optimally set the
quality of the signals they release. If this is the case, then the dynamic properties of
3a market should be analyzed by explicitly modeling such decisions.
In this paper I take a ﬁrst step at addressing this issue by studying a dynamic asset
market with risk-averse, competitive agents, in which control over the information ﬂow
is exerted by a monopolistic analyst selling long-lived information. In every period the
analyst optimally chooses the quality of the information she distributes to the agents
in the asset market. Within this framework, I characterize the optimal solution to the
analyst’s intertemporal proﬁt maximization problem and investigate how this aﬀects
agents’ trading behavior and the dynamic properties of the asset market. This has
an independent interest since, to the best of my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper
that provides such an analysis within a discrete-time, dynamic rational expectations
equilibrium model. In a 2-period setup, I show that optimality on the side of the
analyst calls for an increasing pattern of signal quality. This, in turn, implies an
increasing pattern of market depth and a rapid devaluation of the information sold. 3
The paper contributes to the literature on insider trading that, starting with
the pioneering work of Kyle (1985), has devoted attention to gauge the impact of
trading by a strategic agent on price eﬃciency. Leland (1992) shows that insider
trading accelerates the resolution of fundamental uncertainty. Fishman and Hagerty
(1992), in a model where the insider is not the only agent possessing fundamental
information, argue that the presence of a better informed insider may discourage
costly research from market professionals and, under some parameter conﬁgurations,
lead to a less informative stock price. 4 The present work complements this argument
by questioning – in the case of long-lived information – whether trading by an insider
allows information impounding into asset prices in the most “eﬀective” way.
The paper also has important empirical and policy implications. First, it pre-
dicts that insiders should rather base their trading activity on long-lived information.
Indeed, as argued above, thanks to his superior ability to control the ﬂow of such
4information, an insider is likely to face a lower number of (potentially) competing
agents, and enjoy the possibility of slowly exploiting his informational advantage.
This suggests that insider trading should be based on information that can be re-
peatedly exploited before it becomes publicly known. 5
Second, the paper strengthens the case against insider trading, showing that in
contrast to what most of the literature on the subject traditionally maintains (see e.g.,
Carlton and Fischel (1983), Leland (1992), and Manne (1966)), in a dynamic context
insider trading, far from accelerating the resolution of uncertainty, may actually slow
down information impounding into prices, yielding a thinner market. This adds to the
standard arguments calling for strict insider trading regulation. Indeed, the durable
goods monopolist, by renting manages to keep up the price of the good he supplies,
extracting a higher surplus from consumers. Similarly, an insider by exerting a tighter
control over the information ﬂow, manages to keep up market thinness, extracting
higher rents from liquidity traders. 6 A legislation designed to eﬀectively curb insider
trading may thus facilitate the transmission of fundamental information into prices.
This, in turn, may eventually enhance the eﬃciency of the market and reduce the
market impact of trades, implying lower trading costs and improving market liquidity.
Finally, this work also contributes to the literature on ﬁnancial markets informa-
tion sales. This has mainly focused on the static problem faced by a monopolistic
information provider selling signals either directly, as in the case of an investment
advisor, or indirectly, as in the case of a mutual fund (see Admati and Pﬂeiderer
(1986), (1988a), and (1990)). Fishman and Hagerty (1995) show that a strategic
agent can use information sales as a commitment device to trade aggressively against
a symmetrically informed peer. Allen (1990) shows that the credibility problem faced
by an information seller needing to prove his access to superior information may leave
room for ﬁnancial intermediaries to appropriate part of the seller’s information value.
5Simonov (1999) studies the eﬀect of competition among analysts in the Admati and
Pﬂeiderer (1986)’s context, showing that externalities in information transmission
may lead to counterintuitive results. 7 Little attention has been devoted to study the
dynamics of the analyst’s information sales problem. 8 A notable exception is repre-
sented by Naik (1997) who studies the single-shot problem of an analyst selling a ﬂow
of information in a continuous time model. However, as in Naik the analyst’s decision
is made “once-and-for-all,” no intertemporal competition problem arises there.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I present the static bench-
mark where I review the results of Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1986) and prove that in
a static setup a market where information is sold by a monopolistic analyst and one
where an insider trades generate the same patterns of depth and price informative-
ness. In section 2 I present the 2-period model with long-lived information and in
section 3 I study the analyst’s optimal sales policy. In section 4 I compare patterns
of depth and price informativeness across the two markets and analyze numerically
the properties of the general N > 2-period model. Finally, in section 5 I discuss the
eﬀects of market segmentation and public announcements on the analyst’s control of
the information ﬂow. A ﬁnal section contains concluding remarks while most of the
proofs are relegated to the appendix.
1 The Static Benchmark
Consider a market where a single risky asset with liquidation value v ∼ N(¯ v,τ−1
v ) and
a riskless asset with unitary return are traded. In this market competitive speculators
or an insider trade along with noise traders against a competitive, risk-neutral market
making sector.
In the former case there is a continuum of informed traders in the interval [0,1].
Every informed trader i (potentially) receives a signal si = v+i, where i ∼ N(0,τ−1
 ),
6v and i are independent and errors are also independent across agents. Let the
informed traders’ preferences over ﬁnal wealth Wi be represented by a CARA utility
function U(Wi) = −exp{−Wi/γ}, where γ > 0 denotes the coeﬃcient of constant
absolute risk tolerance and Wi = (v − p)xi indicates the proﬁt of buying xi units of
the asset at price p.
In the market with the insider, a risk-neutral, strategic agent holds a perfect signal
about the liquidation value v and trades a quantity xI to maximize his expected ﬁnal
wealth.
In both markets noise traders submit a random demand u (independent of all
other random variables in the model), with u ∼ N(0,τ−1
u ). Finally, assume that in
the competitive market, given v, the average signal
R 1
0 sidi equals v almost surely (i.e.
errors cancel out in the aggregate:
R 1
0 idi = 0).
A. The Equilibrium in the Competitive Market
In this section I present a version of the traditional large-market noisy rational ex-
pectations equilibrium market, as studied by Admati (1985), Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980), Hellwig (1980), and Vives (1995a).
To ﬁnd the equilibrium in this market, assume that each informed trader submits
a price contingent order X(si,p) specifying the desired position in the risky asset
for any price p and restrict attention to linear equilibria where X(si,p) = asi − bp.
Competitive, risk-neutral market makers observe the aggregate order ﬂow L(p) =
R 1
0 xidi + u = av + u − bp and set a semi-strong eﬃcient price. If we let zC = av + u
denote the informational content of the order ﬂow, then the following result applies:
Proposition 1 In the competitive market there exists a unique linear equilibrium. It
is symmetric and given by X(si,p) = a(si−p) and p = E[v|zC] = λCzC +(1−λCa)¯ v,
where a = γτ, λC = aτu/τC and τC = (Var[v|zC])−1 = τv + a2τu.
7Proof. See Admati (1985) and Vives (1995a). QED
Intuitively, an informed speculator’s trading aggressiveness a increases in the pre-
cision of his private signal and in the risk tolerance coeﬃcient. Market makers’
reaction to the presence of informed speculators λC = aτu/τ is captured by the OLS
regression coeﬃcient of the unknown payoﬀ value on the order ﬂow. As is common
in this literature, λC measures the reciprocal of market depth (see e.g., Kyle (1985)
1985 and Vives (1995a)), and its value determines the extent of noise traders’ ex-
pected losses: E[u(v − p)] = −λCτ−1
u . The informativeness of the equilibrium price
is measured by the reciprocal of the payoﬀ conditional variance given the order ﬂow:
(Var[v|zC])−1 = τC. The higher τC, the smaller the uncertainty on the true payoﬀ
value once the order-ﬂow has been observed.
B. The Equilibrium in the Strategic Market
The linear equilibrium of the strategic market is given by the well known result due
to Kyle (1985). Assume the insider submits a linear market order XI(v) = α+βv to
the market making sector indicating the desired position in the risky asset. 9 Upon
observing the aggregate order ﬂow zI = xI + u, market makers set the semi-strong
eﬃcient equilibrium price. Restricting attention to linear equilibria, the following
result holds:
Proposition 2 In the strategic market there exists a unique linear equilibrium given





τu/τv, and τI = (Var[v|zI])−1 = 2τv.
Proof. See Kyle (1985). QED
Owing to camouﬂage opportunities, the insider’s aggressiveness β is larger (smaller),
the more (less) dispersed is the distribution of noise traders’ demand. Conversely,
8market makers’ reaction to the presence of the insider (λI) is harsher (softer) the
more concentrated is the demand of noise traders. A noisier market thus spurs a
more aggressive insider’s trading; owing to the insider’s risk-neutrality, these two
countervailing eﬀects exactly cancel out. As a consequence, price informativeness
does not depend on τu and is given by τI = 2τv. 10
C. The Information Market
Suppose now as in Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1986) that the private signal each trader
observes in the competitive asset market is sold by a monopolistic buy-side analyst
who has a perfect knowledge of the asset pay-oﬀ realization. 11 Furthermore, assume
that (i) the analyst does not trade on the information she sells, and (ii) she truth-
fully provides the information she promises to traders. The last assumption clearly
simpliﬁes the analysis. Indeed, recent research has outlined the tendency displayed
by sell-side analysts to provide biased information. However, diﬀerently from their
sell-side counterparts, buy-side analysts privately provide investment advice services
to their clients (mutual funds and pension funds). Therefore, absent the need to
preserve privileged access to companies’ information, they are unlikely to feel the
pressure towards issuing public investment recommendations that please ﬁrms’ man-
agers. Furthermore, their ﬁrms do not perform investment banking or brokerage
services. Hence, their research output is likely to be less biased than the one provided
by sell-side analysts. 12
The error aﬀecting each trader’s signal can be thought as an interpretation mistake
that the trader commits when processing the information he receives (see Admati and
Pﬂeiderer (1986)). An analyst providing vague predictions embeds a low precision
τ in the signal she sells. The lower (higher) is τ, the more (less) vague is the
analyst’s information release, and the more (less) is each trader’s information likely
9to be incorrectly interpreted. Given that the analyst holds all the bargaining power,
in order to receive information each trader i pays a price that makes him indiﬀerent
between observing or not the signal si. Denoting by φ such a price
E[E[U(Wi − φ)|{si,p}]] = E[E[U(Wi)|p]].








where τiC = (Var[v|si,p])−1 = τC+τ. Thus, each trader pays a price which is a mono-
tone transformation of the informational advantage he acquires over market makers
by observing the signal. The analyst faces a trade-oﬀ: on the one hand she would like
to make each trader’s informational advantage as large as possible, increasing τ and
thus τiC. On the other hand, as each trader’s speculative aggressiveness is directly
related to his signal’s precision, increasing τ enhances price eﬃciency (τC), and thus
reduces the signal’s value. Maximizing (1) with respect to τ the analyst ﬁnds the








Hence, the analyst sells a signal that is more (less) informative the higher (lower)
is the unconditional noise-to-signal ratio and the more risk-averse the traders are –
poorer ex-ante information and/or noisier markets allow the analyst to release less
vague predictions.
Note that ˆ τ minimizes λ
−1
C . The intuition is straightforward: the analyst seeks
to extract the maximum aggregate surplus from informed traders. Such surplus, in
10turn, increases in the informational advantage traders have vis-` a-vis market makers.
When such advantage is maximal, market depth is at its minimum, and traders are
also willing to pay the highest price.
Furthermore, according to (2), the equilibrium market parameters replicate those





τv/τu; thus, price informativeness τC = τv + a2τu =
2τv = τI, and the reciprocal of market depth λC = (1/2)
p
τu/τv = λI. Summarizing:
Proposition 3 In the static information market, the analyst sells a signal with preci-
sion ˆ τ = (1/γ)
p
τv/τu; such information quality minimizes market depth replicating
the equilibrium properties of an asset market with a single, risk-neutral insider.
The equivalence between the analyst’s and the insider’s problems can be best













The analyst who wishes to maximize her expected proﬁts chooses a signal quality
ˆ τ such that the stock market is as thin as possible. In this way she maximizes the
aggregate rents she extracts from competitive traders which, given the “zero-sum”
nature of the market game, are just the ﬂip side of the coin of noise traders’ expected
losses. However, this is the same result obtained in a market with a risk-neutral
insider that in equilibrium sees his ex-ante proﬁts (i.e. the expected losses of noise
traders) maximized when the impact of his trades (as measured by λI) is as large as
possible. 13 Therefore, in a static information market, the way in which a perfectly
informed agent conveys fundamental information to the market does not matter. 14
112 A Dynamic Asset Market with Long Lived In-
formation
Consider now a 2-period extension of the market analyzed in the previous section.
In particular, assume that assets are traded for two periods and that in period 3 the
risky asset is liquidated and the value v collected (thus, p3 = v).
In the competitive market, every informed trader i in each period n = 1,2 (po-
tentially) receives a private signal sin = v + in, where in ∼ N(0,τ−1
n ), v and in
are independent, and errors are also independent across agents and periods (therefore
private information is “long lived”). Assume that a trader i’s preferences over ﬁnal
wealth Wi2 are represented by a CARA utility function U(Wi2) = −exp{−Wi2/γ},
where Wi2 = (p2 − p1)xi1 + (v − p2)xi2 denotes the trader’s second period wealth.
In the strategic market, before the ﬁrst period, the insider observes v and then
chooses XIn, in every period n to maximize his expected ﬁnal wealth.
In both markets noise traders demand follows an independently and identically
normally distributed process {un}2
n=1 (independent of all other random variables in
the model), with un ∼ N(0,τ−1
u ) in every period n. Finally, assume that in the
competitive market given v and for every n, the average signal
R 1
0 sindi equals almost
surely v (i.e. errors cancel out in the aggregate:
R 1
0 indi = 0).
A. The Equilibrium in the Dynamic Competitive Market
Let us indicate with sn
i and pn respectively, the sequence of private signals and prices
a trader has observed up to period n. In every period n = 1,2 an informed trader sub-
mits a price contingent order Xn(sn
i ,pn−1,·) indicating the position desired in the risky
asset at every price pn. Restricting attention to linear equilibria it is possible to show





12and on the sequence of equilibrium prices: Xn(˜ sin,pn) = an˜ sin−ϕn(pn), where ϕn(pn)
is a linear function of the sequence pn. Market makers in every period observe the net




0 xin−1di+un = zCn+ϕn(pn)−ϕn−1(pn−1),
where zCn = ∆anv + un indicates the informational content of period n net order
ﬂow, and set a semi-strong eﬃcient equilibrium price conditional on past and current
information pn = E[v|z
n−1
C ,zCn]. 15
Proposition 4 In the 2-period competitive market, there exists a unique linear
equilibrium. The equilibrium is symmetric and given by Xn(sn
i ,pn) = an(˜ sin −
pn), and pn = λCnzCn + (1 − λCn∆an)pn−1, n = 1,2, where an = γ(
Pn
t=1 τt),




t=1 τtsit), zCn = ∆anv + un, λCn = ∆anτu/τn, and τCn =
(Var[v|pn])−1 = τv + τu
Pn
t=1(∆an)2.
Proof. See Vives (1995a). QED
In every period n an informed trader speculates according to the sum of the
precisions of his private signals weighted by the risk tolerance coeﬃcient; market
makers observe the (net) aggregate order ﬂow and set the semi-strong eﬃcient price
pn attributing weight λCn = ∆anτu/τCn to its informational content zCn = ∆anv+un.
The information impounded in the equilibrium price is thus reﬂected in the public
precision τCn = (Var[v|zn
C])−1 = τv + τu
Pn
t=1(∆an)2.
B. The Equilibrium in the Dynamic Strategic Market
Assume that in every period n the insider submits a linear market order XIn(v,pn−1) =
βnv+δn(pn−1), where δn(pn−1) denotes a function of the sequence of prices pn−1. Mar-
ket makers observe the (sequence of) aggregate order ﬂow(s) zIn = xIn+un (zn
I ), and
set the semi-strong eﬃcient equilibrium price pn = E[v|z
n−1
I ,zIn]. In this setup the
following result holds:
13Proposition 5 In the 2-period strategic market there exists a unique linear equilib-
rium given by XIn(v,pn−1) = βn(v − pn−1) and pn = λInzIn + pn−1, n = 1,2, where










































Proof. See Huddart, Hughes, and Levine (2001). QED
As more information is impounded in the price, the severity of the adverse selection
problem decreases, and market makers set a less steep price schedule: λI2 < λI1. As a
consequence, proﬁt opportunities decline, and the insider turns to a more aggressive
trading behavior: β2 > β1.
3 A Dynamic Market for Information
In this section I use the results of section 1.A to determine the optimal policy of the
information provider. This is done in two steps: ﬁrst, I obtain a trader i’s value for
the sequence of signals {si1,si2}; second, I solve for the analyst’s optimal information
sales policy.
14A. The Value of Long Lived Information
As done in section 1.C, assume now that the signal each trader receives in every
period n = 1,2 is sold by a monopolistic analyst who has perfect knowledge of the
asset pay-oﬀ realization v, and does not trade on such information. Furthermore,
assume the analyst truthfully provides the information she promises to each trader.
As in every period n she extracts all the surplus, the analyst sets the price (φn) for
the signal (sin) equal to value that leaves the trader indiﬀerent between acquiring or
not the signal:
Proposition 6 In the 2-period information market, the maximum price a trader i is
willing to pay to buy a signal sin in each period n = 1,2 is given by φ1, φ2, where





















where τiCn = (Var[v|sn
i ,pn])−1 = τCn +
Pn
t=1 τt.
Proof. See the appendix. QED
The ﬁrst period signal price is the sum of two components capturing the trader’s
informational advantage vis-` a-vis market makers that the signal allows in the ﬁrst
and in the second period. The intuition is as follows. In period 1 a trader buys si1
and establishes a position in the risky asset Xi(si1,p1). The expected utility of his
ﬁnal wealth then depends on the position Xi(·) (times the return from buying/selling
the asset at p1 and liquidating it at v) plus the change in the ﬁrst period position
15he will eventually make at time two (times the return from changing the position
at p2 and liquidating such change at v). However, the latter component depends on
the change in price which, in turn, depends on the arrival of private information in
period two. As the trader cannot anticipate such “new” information in period one,
his expected utility from acquiring si1 depends only on the informational advantage
the signal gives him in that period: 16






The price the trader is willing to pay to use si1 in period one is thus the one that








The signal si1 has however an added value, as it allows the trader to keep an informa-
tional advantage in the second period as well when the analyst sells the second signal
(without having to buy a second signal). Such added value is given by the price the








In the second period, as a signal has already been sold, the trader compares the
precision of the forecast she obtains from buying one additional signal to the one she
gets from not buying it and using both period’s prices and the ﬁrst period signal. 17
16B. The Analyst’s Optimal Policy
As argued in section 1.C, in order to make information sales proﬁtable, the analyst
“adds” some noise to the information she possesses. Thus, in a dynamic setup, in
every period n the analyst chooses the precision τn of the normal random variable
n from which the error term is drawn.
Using the expressions for the price of information obtained in proposition 6 and



















2 has the same functional form as ˆ τ. However, τ∗
2 > ˆ τ. Indeed, given
any τ1, the analyst’s second period proﬁt maximization problem is similar to the one
she faces in the static market. However, as the precision of the information traders
hold before buying the second period signal (i.e. τiC1) is strictly higher than the one
they hold prior to acquiring information in a static market (i.e. τv), the signal quality
the analyst chooses in the former case must be strictly higher than the one she sets
in the latter.







































17The next proposition characterizes the solution to (5), comparing it with the static
benchmark.
Proposition 7 In the 2-period information market, there exists a unique sequence
of optimal signal precisions {τ∗
1,τ∗
2} that solves the analyst’s proﬁt maximization
problem, where
1. τ∗









1 < ˆ τ < τ∗
2.
Proof. See the appendix. QED
In a dynamic market an analyst is faced with two problems: ﬁrst, and similarly
to the one-shot information sales case, she needs to take into account the negative
eﬀect that the price externality induced by the sale of information has on both period
proﬁts. 18 Second, and diﬀerently from the one-shot case, she faces an intertemporal
self-competition problem. As a durable goods monopolist (Bulow (1982), (1986),
and Coase (1972)) once the ﬁrst signal has been sold to informed traders, in order to
make a new signal palatable to potential buyers, she must render partially obsolete
the ﬁrst period signal. The analyst thus scales down the quality of the ﬁrst period
information, and increases the quality of the information sold in the second period.




























for any given ﬁrst period signal quality τ1. Thus, the price traders are willing to
pay in order to get si2 captures the informational advantage they have in the second
18period vis-` a-vis market makers net of the informational advantage they would have
holding si1 and observing both period equilibrium prices {p1,p2}. 19 To maximize her
proﬁt, the analyst has thus an incentive to market a signal that in a way “kills-oﬀ”
the second-hand market for the ﬁrst period signal. 20 She does so by selling a signal
whose precision τ∗
2 is strictly higher than the precision of the ﬁrst period signal.
















































As in the static case, she is interested in choosing a signal that makes the ﬁrst period
market as thin as possible. However, she must now take into account two additional
contrasting eﬀects. Increasing the ﬁrst period signal precision allows traders to grab
a higher share of second period noise traders’ losses and this, in turn, increases the
price they are willing to pay to get si1. On the other hand, a higher ﬁrst period signal
precision inevitably increases second period market depth, thus reducing the size of
the second period rents the analyst can extract from traders. As the second eﬀect is
stronger than the ﬁrst, the analyst chooses τ∗
1 < ˆ τ. 21
Therefore, the analyst sells a pair of signals that impoverishes ﬁrst period infor-
mation quality while consistently enhancing second period private information. As
long lived information is a durable good that cannot be rented, the analyst needs to
force the obsolescence of her ﬁrst period signal. She does so combining a low ﬁrst
period signal quality (hence, reducing the product durability as in Bulow (1986)) and
introducing high second period signal quality (hence, marketing a new product that
makes the old one obsolete as in Waldman (1993)). 22
Denote by φ1(τ∗
1),φ2(τ∗
1), respectively the optimal price of the ﬁrst and second
19period signal and with φ(ˆ τ) the optimal price in the static market. The next propo-
sition derives the implications of the optimal solution for the price of information and
the depth of the market.
Proposition 8 The information allocation chosen by the analyst prescribes that
1. φ1(τ∗
1) > φ(ˆ τ) > φ2(τ∗
1);
2. λC(ˆ τ) > λC1(τ∗
1) > λC2(τ∗
1).
Therefore, while the price of private information decreases across trading periods,
depth increases.
Proof. See the appendix. QED
As the analyst kills-oﬀ the second-hand market for the ﬁrst period signal, traders’
net informational advantage vis-` a-vis market makers decreases and the price they are
willing to pay to buy si2 ends up being lower than the one they pay to get si1. The
ﬂip side of the coin is that the adverse selection problem faced by market makers
becomes less severe and market depth increases.
Increasing patterns of market depth have been documented at the inter-daily level
by the empirical ﬁnance literature (see Foster and Viswanathan (1993b)). Theoretical
explanations of this phenomenon have always been related to the strategic trading of
insiders facing some form of competitive pressure, that speeds-up the market makers’
learning process. Foster and Viswanathan (1990) show that a single insider is forced to
spend his informational advantage at a faster pace than he would otherwise do, owing
to the presence of impending public information. Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992)
consider a market where the competition among symmetrically informed insiders
forces more aggressive trading and a faster unfolding of the underlying uncertainty.
According to proposition 8, in contrast, increasing levels of depth may be entirely
20compatible with an asset market where no trader has market power, and forthcoming
public information poses no threat to informed traders’ speculative abilities. In such
a market, instead, the information ﬂow is controlled by a monopolistically informed
agent who, owing to the nature of the information she sells, intertemporally competes
against herself. 23
4 Insider Trading and Information Sales
We are now ready to contrast the dynamic properties of the competitive market where
information is sold with those of the market with a strategic trader. An immediate
consequence of proposition 5 is the following:
Proposition 9 In the 2-period asset market:
1. β2 < γτ∗
2;
2. λI2 > λC2;
3. τI2 < τC2.
Proof. See the appendix. QED
Therefore, as opposed to the static market result, in a dynamic market an in-
sider induces diﬀerent patterns for second period depth and price informativeness.
In particular, as he directly uses his informational advantage, he avoids the eﬀect
of intertemporal self-competition, fully internalizes the negative eﬀect of aggressive
speculation, and trades less intensely. This, in turn, makes the second period market
thinner and its price less informative. 24
The insider’s second period problem is akin to the problem he faces in the static
market. The equilibrium solution prescribes that he trades in a way to minimize
21second period market depth. The information monopolist, instead, chooses the second
period information quality to minimize second period depth but, as argued above, also
to minimize the second period value competitive traders attach to their ﬁrst period















Therefore, τ2 must make noise traders’ second period expected losses as large as
possible while slashing the information advantage traders have in the second period
thanks to the signal they bought in period 1. As (τC2/(τC2+τ1)) is strictly decreasing
in τ1, this forces the analyst to sell a signal whose precision is strictly higher than
the one minimizing (1/λC2).
According to proposition 9 and diﬀerently from proposition 3, in a dynamic mar-
ket the way through which a monopolistically informed agent conveys information
about the fundamentals to the market does matter. In particular, whether such in-
formation is exploited directly or sold to competitive traders changes the patterns of
depth and price eﬃciency. In contrast to the view according to which insider trad-
ing improves the accuracy of stock prices (see e.g., Carlton and Fischel (1983), and
Manne (1966)), the above result shows instead that a single insider can exploit his
monopolistic position in such a way as to choose the rate at which the market learns
the fundamental, in this way impairing second period liquidity and price eﬃciency.
Conversely, a monopolistic analyst, owing to intertemporal competition, loses con-
trol over the information ﬂow and speeds up the market learning process. In the spirit
of the durable goods monopolist interpretation, the insider thus acts in a way that is
much akin to the monopolistic producer that rents instead of selling. Indeed, the mo-
nopolistic renter fully internalizes the negative eﬀect of overproduction by keeping the
ownership of the goods he markets and thus cuts back on the quantities he releases.
22The insider, on the other hand, by holding on to his informational advantage, directly
bears the negative eﬀects of an excessively aggressive behavior, and speculates less
intensely. 25
A. The General N-Period Information Market
The intuition gained in the previous section shows that in a dynamic market an insider
is able to retain strong control over the information leakage produced by his trades.
Conversely, an analyst facing intertemporal competition, is forced to give up most
of such control to information buyers. If that is the case, as the number of trading
rounds increases this lack of control should be exacerbated.
In this section, I compare the multiperiod versions of the 2-period market of section
2. As is well known, both the results in propositions 4, and 5 can be generalized to
an arbitrary number of periods N > 2 (see, respectively Vives (1995a), and Kyle
(1985)). Building on these extensions, consider now the general, N ≥ 2-period case
and suppose that in every period n the analyst sells a signal of a diﬀerent (conditional)
precision τn, charging a price φn. The next proposition gives an explicit expression
for φn, generalizing proposition 6.
Proposition 10 In the N ≥ 2-period information market, the maximum price φn

























where τCn = (Var[v|pn])−1 = τv + τu
Pn





Proof. See the appendix. QED





































Thus, in the N-period market, in every period n a signal is useful both because of the
increase in informational advantage it allows a trader to hold in the same period n (the
ﬁrst term in the above expression) and because of the increase in the informational
advantage it determines in every future period k = n + 1,n + 2,...,N (the second
term).




τiCN−1/τu. Recursive substitution of τ∗
N into every period n’s proﬁt
function, shows that the analyst solves a sequence of maximization problems such




























j=1 τj + τiCN−1
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Using the above expression for the value of information I run numerical simula-
tions for the case N = 4. The aim is to verify that the results obtained in propo-
sition 9 still hold when the number of trading rounds increases. Letting τv,τu,γ ∈
{.2,.4,.6,.8,1,4,6}, in all of the simulations the analyst induces a more aggressive
traders’ behavior than that displayed by the insider. Hence, the eﬀect of intertempo-
ral competition leads the analyst to lose control over the information ﬂow, whereas
24the insider, lacking competitive pressure, can trade less aggressively. As a result from
the second trading round onwards, the competitive market is more liquid than the
strategic market (see ﬁgure 1).
[Figure 1 about here.]
As to price informativeness, the numerical simulations show that the competitive
market leads to a more rapid resolution of the fundamentals’ uncertainty than the
strategic market starting from the ﬁrst trading round. The intuition is straightfor-
ward: as the number of trading rounds increases, traders are willing to pay a higher
price for the ﬁrst period signal. This, in turn, shifts upwards the information quality
supplied by the analyst, thus increasing competitive traders’ aggressiveness (see ﬁgure
2).
[Figure 2 about here.]
5 Extensions
In order to increase her grip over the information ﬂow, the analyst may want to
consider two diﬀerent strategies. She may try and segment the ﬁrst period information
market, so to reduce the fraction of traders that already possess a signal in the second
period. Also, she may want to publicly release some information at the beginning of
period two in order to reduce the informational advantage that traders have acquired
in period one. Both strategies attempt to reduce the competitive pressure the analyst
faces in the second period. However, as shown in this section, none of them can
increase the analyst’s proﬁt.
25A. Market Segmentation
Consider an extension of the 2-period market analyzed in section 2 in which every
informed trader i in each period n (potentially) receives a private signal sin = v+in,
where in ∼ N(0,τ−1
in). All the remaining assumptions are kept as in section 2. Under
these conditions, the following result holds: 26
Proposition 11 In the 2-period competitive market, there exists a unique linear
equilibrium. The equilibrium is given by Xin(sn
i ,pn) = ain(˜ sin − pn), and pn =
λCnzCn + (1 − λCn∆an)pn−1, n = 1,2, where ain = γ(
Pn





t=1 τitsit), zCn = ∆anv + un, ∆an =
R 1
0 (ain − ain−1)di, λCn = ∆anτu/τCn, and
τCn = (Var[v|pn])−1 = τv + τu
Pn
t=1(∆an)2.
Therefore, the heterogeneity of signals’ precisions is reﬂected into traders’ spec-
ulative aggressiveness. In the above market the analyst may decide to provide each
trader with a signal of a diﬀerent precision. The following proposition shows that this
is never optimal: 27
Proposition 12 In the 2-period information market with heterogeneous signal pre-
cision, in every period n = 1,2 the analyst sells to all traders a signal of the same
precision.
Proof. See the appendix. QED
The proof is based on two arguments. First, notice that in every period n = 1,2
price informativeness τCn only depends on informed agents’ average signal precision.
Thus, τCn is invariant with respect to a distribution of signals’ precisions that leaves
its average unchanged. Next, in the ﬁrst period the analyst’s objective function
is concave in the informational advantage each trader holds over market makers in
every period n (τiCn/τCn). Thus, owing to Jensen’s inequality, given two information
26allocations yielding the same average total precision, in every period n the analyst
obtains a higher proﬁt when she sells to all traders a signal with the same precision
(thus providing all traders with the same private precision) than when she sells signals
with diverse precisions. It then follows that in every optimal information allocation,
τiC1 is the same across all traders, and τ∗
i2(τiC1) = τ∗
2 for every trader i ∈ [0,1].
A direct implication of the above argument, is that the analyst never ﬁnds it
proﬁtable to segment the market – i.e. to sell information of precision τ∗
1 > 0 (τ∗
1 = 0)
to a fraction 0 < µ < 1 (1−µ) of traders in the ﬁrst period. Indeed, such information
allocation is dominated by one in which all traders in the ﬁrst period receive a signal
of precision µτ∗
1. Intuitively, market segmentation yields two contrasting eﬀects. On
the one hand, by reducing the fraction of traders that receive information in the
ﬁrst period, the analyst faces a reduced pressure to sell a better signal in the second
period, as part of the population that buys information in the second period holds
no previous signal. This, in turn, slows down information devaluation, increasing
the analyst’s proﬁt. On the other hand, since equilibrium prices reﬂect fundamental
information, the value that each trader assigns to a signal in the second period – after
having observed the price sequence – is lower. This, in turn, limits the price that the
analyst can extract from those traders that did not receive a signal in the ﬁrst period.
As the second eﬀect is always stronger than the ﬁrst, market segmentation never pays.
B. Public Disclosure
In a large market with diﬀerential information, disclosing to each trader i the signal
each trader j has received (j 6= i) is practically unfeasible. A possible way out is for the
analyst to reveal the aggregate signal she sold to traders in the ﬁrst period (namely
¯ s1 =
R 1
0 si1di). Notice, however, that given the analyst’s perfect knowledge of the
fundamental v, such a strategy leads to complete information revelation, preventing
27the sale of a new signal in period 2. 28
Based on these considerations, I address the issue of information disclosure in the
following way: suppose that at the beginning of period 2 the analyst discloses one of
the signals she sold in period 1, say sj1 = v + j1 (i.e. the analyst chooses at random
which signal to communicate to the market). In a large market each trader assigns
zero probability to the event that his signal will be made public. Therefore, in order
to determine the price of information in this setup we can focus on the equilibrium
in which each trader i ∈ [0,1] anticipates observing a (public) signal sj1, j 6= i at the
beginning of period 2.
Proposition 13 In the 2-period competitive market with disclosure, there exists a
unique linear equilibrium. The equilibrium is symmetric and given by X1(si1,p1) =
a1(si1−p1), X2(s2
i,p2;sj1) = a2(˜ si2−p2), p1 = λC1zC1+(1−λC1a1)¯ v, p2 = αE[v|z2
C]+
(1 − α)sj1, where an = γ(
Pn
t=1 τt), E[v|z2





t=1 τtsit), zCn = ∆anv+un, λCn = ∆anτu/τCn, τCn ≡ (Var[v|pn])−1 =
τv + τu
Pn
t=1(∆an)2, α = τC2/ˆ τC2, and ˆ τC2 ≡ (Var[v|z2;sj1])−1 = τC2 + τ1.
Proof. See the appendix. QED
Information disclosure does not change the nature of the strategies that traders
adopt in the no-disclosure equilibrium. On the other hand, it improves the market
maker’s estimation. While in the no-disclosure model second period public precision
is given by Var[v|z2]−1 ≡ τC2 = τv + τu
P2
t=1(∆at)2, in the model with disclosure
Var[v|z2;sj1]−1 ≡ ˆ τC2 = τC2 + τ1: the precision incorporated in the public signal
increases the quality of the public forecast. This, in turn, aﬀects the price each



















ˆ τC2 + τ1
,
where ˆ τiC2 = ˆ τC2 + τ1 + τ2. A straightforward calculation shows then that ˆ φn < φn,
n = 1,2. Therefore,
Proposition 14 The analyst never ﬁnds it proﬁtable to publicly disclose information
in the second period.
The intuition is as follows: second period information disclosure has two eﬀects. First,
it reduces the added value that the ﬁrst period signal has in the second period, in















However, at the same time it also reduces the uncertainty over the asset value v, and
thus the gross informational advantage that traders acquire when they buy a new













The latter eﬀect is always stronger than the former. Hence, with information disclo-
sure the maximum price the analyst can extract for si2 is lower. 31
Propositions 8, 12, and 14 show that while the analyst’s and the durable goods
monopolist’s problem share various common features, they also display a number of
diﬀerences. First, note that as opposed to the durable goods producer, the analyst
29does not produce the fundamental information on which the signals she sells are based.
In other words, she only transforms a raw-material whose production is located at the
upstream level. As a consequence, the strategy of accelerating the ﬁrst period signal
decay also impacts on her ability to sell further signals in the future. This, in turn,
implies that a policy of increasing such a rate of decay through public disclosure is
never proﬁtable. 32
Also, diﬀerently from a durable goods monopolist, the analyst ﬁnds it optimal
to serve the whole market in both periods. Indeed, segmenting the ﬁrst period in-
formation market relaxes second period competition but also reduces the proﬁts the
analyst reaps from ﬁrst period traders. According to proposition 12 the latter eﬀect
is always stronger than the former.
6 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In this paper I have argued that as fundamental information resembles in many
respects a durable good, the eﬀects of its incorporation into stock prices depend on
who is the agent controlling its ﬂow. A monopolistic analyst selling information in
a dynamic market tackles an intertemporal self-competition problem that leads her
to partially release the control over the information ﬂow to traders. Conversely, an
insider acts “as if” he would rent the information he possesses to the market, thus
securing a tighter control over the information ﬂow. As a result, for a given piece
of information, a market where information is provided by an analyst is deeper and
more eﬃcient than one where information is transmitted by an insider.
A number of issues are left for future research. Among these, competition between
diﬀerent analysts deserves special consideration. Indeed, in a static market, compe-
tition among analysts may lower the pressure to provide signals of a better quality
(Simonov (1999)). To be sure, when signals are correlated, traders may place a higher
30value in holding the signal bundle. This, in turn, relaxes competition, allowing the
analysts to reduce the precision they embed in their signals. As a consequence, traders
base their strategies on information of a lower quality, potentially negatively aﬀecting
the properties of the underlying stock market. In a dynamic market, on the other
hand, the intertemporal competition eﬀect I uncover will still be there, accelerating
the resolution of the underlying uncertainty. Therefore, the overall impact of compe-
tition on market quality will depend on the interplay between the competition-stiﬂing
eﬀect due to signal complementarity, and the competition-enhancing eﬀect due to the
long-lived nature of information.
A related issue refers to the properties of a market where either competing analysts
or multiple insiders provide information. In the latter case the existing literature has
shown that the eﬀect of competition on market quality depends on the correlation
structure of the insiders’ information and on the possibility of coordination. 33 This
suggests that the comparison between the properties of a market where competing
analysts provide information and one with multiple insiders should heavily depend
on the posited information structure.
Also, in the paper I have assumed that the decision to trade on or sell privileged
information is exogenous. However, the paper’s main result raises the issue of why
information sales occur at all in ﬁnancial markets. In other words, one may wonder
why the analyst does not ﬁnd a way to internalize the negative eﬀect of excessive
speculation so to exploit more eﬃciently her information. For example, she could
choose either to directly act as an insider, or (for instance if faced with a capital
constraint) to indirectly sell her information by setting up a mutual fund. In ad-
dressing this issue, however, one may want to consider as well the beneﬁts of direct
information sales brought up by the literature. Indeed, Fishman and Hagerty (1995)
argue that faced with informed competitors, an agent may use information sales as a
31commitment device to trade aggressively in the stock market. This strategy, in turn,
secures the analyst a lager share of the reduced total market proﬁts. 34 Also, Admati
and Pﬂeiderer (1990) show that direct sales of information allow better surplus ex-
traction vis-` a-vis the set-up of a mutual fund, and may thus be preferred as a means
to distribute information. 35 A formal analysis of the conditions under which the cost
of direct information sales brought up by my model is oﬀset either by their strategic
beneﬁt, or by the enhanced surplus-extraction ability they allow, is beyond the scope
of this paper and is left for future research.
Finally, the paper focuses on the single asset case. As traders typically hold
portfolios of assets, a natural application of the present work is to the analysis of the
multi-security case. 36 I leave this and other extensions for further investigation.
32Appendix
Proof of proposition 6.
Start from the second period. Owing to the assumption of a CARA utility func-
tion and the normality of the random variables, a trader’s expected utility from
using the signal she bought in period 1 (together with the information obtained from
the equilibrium price) is given by E[U((v − p2)xi2)|{si1,p1,p2}] = −exp{−a2
1(si1 −
p2)2/(2γ2(τC2+τ1))}. 37 On the other hand if the trader chooses to acquire the second
period signal as well, her expected utility is given by E[U((v−p2)xi2)|{si1,si2,p1,p2}] =
−exp{−a2
2(˜ si2 − p2)2/(2γ2τiC2)}. Using a standard result from normal theory (see
e.g., Danthine and Moresi (1992)), prior to deciding whether or not to buy si2, the
expected utility the trader earns in the ﬁrst case is given by E[U((v − p2)xi2)] =
E[E[U((v − p2)xi2)|{si1,p1,p2}]] = −(τC2/(τC2 + τ1))1/2, whereas in the second case
















Therefore, denoting with φ2(si2||si1,p1,p2) the maximum price the trader is willing
to pay in order to acquire si2 once she has already acquired the ﬁrst signal, the
trader’s certainty equivalent for the second period signal is given by the solution of
exp{φ2(si2||si1,p1,p2)/γ}(τC2/τiC2)1/2 = (τC2/(τC2 + τ1))1/2, or







In the ﬁrst period a trader that buys si1, uses it in both period 1 and 2, and plans to
33buy si2 earns an expected utility given by































whereas a trader that plans to buy no signal makes zero expected proﬁts (as the
information she ends up holding coincides with the one of the market makers that,
under the competitive assumption earn zero proﬁts). Therefore, the maximum price








However, the trader can also use the same signal in period two, insofar as it allows
him to have an informational advantage vis-` a-vis market makers independently from
buying the second signal. The expected utility the trader expects to earn from observ-
ing {si1,p1,p2} is given by E[U((v −p2)xi2)] = −(τC2/(τC2 +τ1))1/2 which compared









Proof of proposition 7.
Given traders’ willingness to pay, the analyst is faced with the problem of choosing
the optimal sequence of signals’ precisions {τ∗
1,τ∗







The ﬁrst order condition for the second period signal precision is given by
γ(τ1 + γ2τ2
1τu + τv − γ2τ2τu)
2τiC1τiC2
= 0, (7)
and its unique positive solution gives τ∗
2 = (1/γ)
p
τiC1/τu. To see that this solution
is a maximum, let F1(τ2) = τC2 +τ1. Then (7) can be rewritten as follows: ψ(τ2) =
(F1(τ2)(τ2 + F1(τ2)))−1γ(F1(τ2) − 2γτ2
2τu). Diﬀerentiating the previous expression












1(τ2)(τ2 + F1(τ2)) + F1(τ2)(1 + F
0
1(τ2))),
and evaluating it at optimum (∂ψ(·)/∂τ2)|τ2=τ∗







2)). As one can check, the sign of the above expression is always negative, and
the proposed solution is indeed a maximum.
Consider now the ﬁrst period. Using τ∗
2 the analyst’s objective function becomes
Z 1
0




























1τu(3 + 2γ(γτ1τu +
√




2(τC1 + τiC1)(2τiC1 + τ∗
2)






τuτv) > 0, and F(ˆ τ) < 0.
35Hence, as F(τ1) is continuous in τ1, there exists a τ∗
1 ∈ (0, ˆ τ1) such that F(τ∗
1) =
0 and F 0(τ∗
1) < 0. To see that such a point is unique indicate with F1(τ1) =
(γ/2)(∂ ln(τiC1/τC1)/∂τ1) and with F2(τ1) = (γ/2)(∂ ln((τC1+τiC1)−1(2τiC1+τ∗
2)/∂τ1).
Hence F(τ1) = F1(τ1) + F2(τ1). Now, both (γ/2)ln(τiC1/τC1) and (γ/2)ln(τC1 +
τiC1)−1(2τiC1+τ∗
2) are unimodal in τ1, in particular F(τ1) > 0 ⇔ τ1 < (1/γ)
p
τv/τu,
while F2(τ1) > 0 ⇔ τ1 < ˜ τ1 < (1/γ)
p




for any η > 0, there is a ˜ ˜ τ1 ∈ (τ∗
1,τ∗
1 + η) such that Fi(τ∗
1) > Fi(˜ ˜ τ1) for i = 1,2.
Hence 0 = F1(τ∗
1) + F2(τ∗
1) > F1(˜ ˜ τ1) + F2(˜ ˜ τ1) and the latter inequality implies that
τ∗
1 is unique.




Proof of proposition 8.
For the ﬁrst part, notice that φ1−φ2 ≥ 0 ⇔ G(τ1) ≡ 4τ3
iC1−τC1(τC1+τiC1)(2τiC1+
τ∗
2) ≥ 0. Evaluating G(0) = −(2τ2
v/γ)
p
τv/τu < 0, while G((1/γ)
p
τv/(3τu)) > 0.
Hence as G(·) is continuous in τ1, there is a ˜ τ1 ∈ (0,(1/γ)
p
τv/(3τu)) such that





iC1τ1 and as all of the terms of the previous expression
are increasing in τ1, the point ˜ τ1 is unique. Now, evaluating F((1/γ)
p
τv/(3τu)) > 0,
hence it must be that ˜ τ1 < (1/γ)
p
τv/(3τu) < τ∗
1 and as for any τ1 > ˜ τ1, G(τ1) > 0,
the result follows.
To see that φ1(τ∗













and its unique maximum coincides with the one of the static information market, i.e.





1 < ˆ τ, hence to prove that φ1(τ∗
1) >
36φ(ˆ τ) it is suﬃcient to show that φ(ˆ τ) < φ1((1/γ)
p
τv/3τu). Evaluating, φ(ˆ τ) <
φ1((1/γ)
p
τv/3τu) if and only if
2γτv(3
√











a condition which is always satisﬁed. Next, to see that φ2(τ∗
















and a direct comparison with φ(ˆ τ) gives the desired result.
For the second part, notice that λC1(τ∗
1) > λC2(τ∗
1) if and only if a1τC2 >
∆a2τC1 ⇔ a2
1τu(τC1 + τiC1)2 > τ2
C1τiC1. Deﬁne H(τ1) = a2
1τu(τC1 + τiC1)2 − τ2
C1τiC1,
and notice that H(0) = −τ3
v, and that limτ1→∞ H(τ1) = ∞. Hence, there is







1τuτv + 6τ1τv) − τ2
v, ˆ τ1 is
unique. Consider then the point ˆ ˆ τ1 = (1/γ)
p
τv/3τu and notice that F(ˆ ˆ τ1) > 0
which implies that τ∗
1 > ˆ ˆ τ1. Evaluating H(ˆ ˆ τ1) = τ2
v/(9γ2τu), which implies that
ˆ τ1 < ˆ ˆ τ1 < τ∗
1 or, equivalently, that λC1(τ∗
1) > λC2(τ∗
1).
To see that λC(ˆ τ) > λC1(τ∗
1), notice that ˆ τ > τ∗
1 and as for τ ≤ ˆ τ, λC1(·)
increases in τ, the result follows.
QED
Proof of proposition 9.
Given the expressions for the equilibrium parameters, start from the second part
of the claim. To see that λI2 > λC2(τ∗
1), notice that given τ∗
2, λC2 = (τC1 +
τiC1)−1(τuτiC1)1/2, hence (∂λC2/∂τ1) < 0 and λC2(τ∗
1) < λC2((1/γ)(τv/3τu)). Thus,
as one can check, λC2((1/γ)(τv/3τu)) < λI2. Next, β2 = (1/2λI2) < (1/2λC2), while
37γτ∗
2 > (1/2λC2). Therefore, γτ∗
2 > β2. Finally, as λI2 > λC2(τ∗
1), and λI2 = β2τuτ
−1
I2 ,











1) or that τI2 < τC2(τ∗
1).
QED
Proof of proposition 10.
Without loss of generality, the proof is given for the case N = 3. Starting from
n = 3, an information buyer that has already observed {si1,si2}, has to decide whether
to acquire si3. If he does so, then according to proposition 4, Xi3(˜ si3,p3) = a3(˜ si3−p3),
with a3 = γ
P3
















On the other hand, if the trader does not buy si3, then it is easy to see that







































Therefore, indicating with φ3(si3||s2
i,p3) the maximum price the trader is willing to
pay in order to acquire si3 once he has already acquired the ﬁrst and second period
signals, his certainty equivalent for the third period signal is given by the solution to
38exp{φ2(si3||s2


















Stepping back to period 2, the price a trader is willing to pay to acquire si2 is the
sum of the price he would pay to exploit the informational advantage in (i) period
two and (ii) in period three. Starting from (ii), as shown above if the trader possesses
si2, then his expected utility from trading in period 3 is given by (9). On the other
hand if the trader only has si1, then it is easy to see that Xi3(si1,p3) = a1(si1 − p3)





























To address point (i), we ﬁrst need to ﬁnd the trader’s second period strategy if he
observes {si1,si2} and if he only observes si1. Start from Xi2(˜ si2,p2), that by dynamic
optimality is the maximizer of










(p3 − p2)xi2 +
a2











Letting F = (2γ2(τC3 +
P2
t=1 τt))−1a2
2, the argument in the above exponential can
39be rewritten as follows:
F(p3 − µ)
2 + ((xi2/γ) + 2F(µ−˜ si2))(p3 − µ)
+ ((xi2/γ) + F(2˜ si2 − µ))µ + F˜ si2 − (xi2/γ)p2,
where p3 − µ is normally distributed (conditionally on {˜ si2,p2}) with mean zero and















Using a standard property of normal random variables, it can be shown that (11) is






2F + ((xi2/2)− 2F˜ si2)µ + F˜ s
2
i2 −(xi2/γ)p2) (12)















+ 2F(˜ si2 − µ)

, (13)
and using the above expressions for µ and Σ one ﬁnds that
Xi2(˜ si2,p2) = a2(˜ si2 − p2). (14)
40Substituting (13) in (12), rearranging and using (14)








































































































41Proof of proposition 12.











0 (ai2 −ai1)di)2τu and
τiC2 = τC2+
P2




Therefore, the second period optimal precision depends on the distribution of the
ﬁrst period signal precision across traders. In particular, if τiC1 is the same for every
i ∈ [0,1], then τ∗
i2 = τ∗
2 for every trader i ∈ [0,1].










Notice that for τi2 = τ∗
i2, the above is a function of τi1. Also, given that τC1 =
τv + (
R 1
0 ai1di)2τu both the ﬁrst and second period public precisions only depend on
informed agents’ average signal precision; hence, they are invariant to a distribution
of signals’ precisions that leaves its average unchanged. Let ¯ τiCn =
R 1
0 τiCndi for
some given distribution of ﬁrst period signals precisions. Then, for such information















for n = 1,2. In words: given two information allocations yielding the same average
total precision, the analyst obtains a higher proﬁt when she sells to all traders a signal
with the same precision (thus providing all traders with the same private precision)
than when she sells signals with diverse precisions. It then follows that in every
42optimal information allocation, τiC1 is the same across all traders and τ∗
i2 = τ∗
2 for
every trader i ∈ [0,1].
QED
Proof of proposition 13.
Let Wi2 = (p2 − p1)xi1 + (v − p2)xi2 denote the ﬁnal wealth of an agent i. The
agent chooses xi1,xi2 to maximize E[U(Wi2)] = −E[exp{−γ−1Wi2}].
Using backward induction, at time 2 trader i chooses xi2 to maximize
−exp{−γ
−1(p2 − p1)xi1}E[exp{γ
−1(v − p2)xi2}|˜ si2,p2;sj1],
given xi1. Normality of the random variables and negative exponential utility yield
Xi2(˜ si2,p2) = a2(˜ si2 −p2), where a2 = γ(
P2
t=1 τt). Substituting the optimal period 2
strategy in the second period objective function and simplifying
E[exp{−γ










where ˆ τiC2 ≡ (Var[v|˜ si2,z2
C;sj1])−1 = ˆ τ2 + τ1 + τ2, and ˆ τ2 ≡ (Var[v|z2;sj1])−1 =
τv + τu
P2
t=1(∆at)2 + τ1. In the ﬁrst period, the agent chooses xi1 to maximize
−E[E[exp{−γ
−1(p2 − p1)xi1}exp{−γ


















The expression in the curly braces of the latter formula is a quadratic form of the
bivariate vector ψ = (˜ si2−p2−µ1,p2−µ2)0 which is normally distributed conditional
43on {si1,p1} with zero mean and variance-covariance matrix Σ:





(˜ si2 − p2)
2































c = (µ2 − p1)xi1 + (a2µ1)2/(2γˆ τiC2), b = (a2
2µ1/(γˆ τiC2),xi1)0, and A is a 2 × 2 matrix
with a11 = a2





































Maximizing the above function with respect to xi1 and indicating with hij the elements



























































where (∆ˆ τC2) ≡ ˆ τC2 − τC1 = (∆a2)2τu + τ1. Using these expressions in (16) and
simplifying yields Xi1(si1,p1) = a1(si1 − p1), where a1 = γτ1.
As to equilibrium prices, in the ﬁrst period market makers observe the aggregate
order ﬂow, extract its informational content zC1 = a1v + u1, and set p1 = E[v|z1].
In the second period, besides the aggregate order ﬂow, the public signal sj1 becomes
available. Thus, market makers set the equilibrium price equal to E[v|z2
C;sj1] =
αE[v|z2
C] + (1 − α)sj1, where α = τC2/ˆ τC2.
QED
45Notes
1Alternatively, it may be useful to think of the insider as of the monopolistic pro-
ducer that rents instead of selling. Indeed, the monopolistic renter by keeping the
ownership of the goods she markets, fully internalizes the negative eﬀect of overpro-
duction and thus cuts back on the quantities she releases; similarly, the insider, by
holding on to his informational advantage, directly bears the negative eﬀects of an
excessively aggressive behavior, and speculates less intensely. Other authors have
adopted the durable goods monopolist paradigm to explore traditional ﬁnance prob-
lems (see e.g. Cestone and White (2003), and DeMarzo and Uroˇ sevi´ c (2006)).
2Examples of the ﬁrst type include He and Wang (1995), Vives ((1995a), (1995b)), Cespa
(2002), and Cespa and Vives (2006); examples of the second type include Admati and
Pﬂeiderer (1988b), Holden and Subrahmanyam (1996), and Foster and Viswanathan
(1996).
3Numerical simulations show that the result carries over to the general N > 2-
period market.
4Other authors have emphasized the eﬀects that insider trading has on the welfare
of market participants (see e.g., Bhattacharya and Nicodano (2001) and Medrano and
Vives (2004)).
5The evidence on insider trading patterns provides some support for this predic-
tion. Surveying the empirical literature on insider trading, Huddart, Ke, and Petroni
(2003) observe that “...insiders know of price-relevant events months and even years
before public disclosure of the event” and that “...abnormal trade by insiders gener-
ally is found to concentrate in the two quarters prior to the disclosure.” Furthermore,
in their study of insider trading patterns in the Milan stock exchange in the years
from 1991 to 1999, Bagliano, Favero, and Nicodano (2001) conclude that insider trad-
ing episodes started taking place on average 39.3 days before the resolution of the
46relevant uncertainty. Finally, Cornell and Sirri (1992) in their detailed analysis of
the Anheuser-Busch’s 1982 tender oﬀer for Campbell Taggart, document how insider
trading episodes repeatedly took place during a month before information about the
merger was made public.
6Incidentally, this argument provides a formalization to Carlton and Fischel (1983)’s
intuition that an insider is better able to control the ﬂow of information generated
within the ﬁrm. Furthermore, it shows that such control comes at the cost of a thinner
and less eﬃcient market.
7Recently, Garc´ ıa and Vanden (2005) analyze competition among mutual funds.
8Cespa and Foucault (2006) study dynamic sales of information by stock ex-
changes.
9As shown by Rochet and Vila (1994), assuming that the insider submits a price
contingent order does not change the equilibrium result.
10Subrahmanyam (1991) shows that if the insider is risk-averse, this result does not
hold.
11Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1986) also consider the case in which the analyst is not
perfectly informed. While the static case can be handled under such assumption, the
dynamic extension I consider in section 3 quickly becomes intractable.
12Sell-side analysts working at investment banks and brokerage ﬁrms are likely to
face a conﬂict of interests mainly for three reasons. First, they may tip investors
towards buying stock of a current or potential investment banking client. Also, they
may provide over optimistic research results to boost brokerage commissions. Finally,
as their access to relevant information often depends on contacts with ﬁrms’ insiders,
they may be unwilling to provide negative information on a ﬁrm in order not to
compromise such contacts. See Cheng, Liu, and Qian (2004) and Groysberg, Healy,
Chapman, and Gui (2005).
4713This is immediate as in any linear equilibrium noise traders’ ex-ante expected
losses are given by E[u(v − p)] = −λIτ−1
u , and, owing to the semi-strong eﬃciency
of the market, when the insider trades with aggressiveness β, λI = βτu/(β2τu + τv).
The insider, thus, sees his equilibrium ex-ante proﬁts (i.e. the losses of noise traders)
maximized when choosing β such that λI is as large as possible.
14This provides a diﬀerent interpretation to Admati and Pﬂeiderer’s (1986) result
showing the superiority of “personalized” information allocations over “newsletters.”
Indeed, it is only by selling diverse signals that the information provider exerts the
same control over the information leakage obtained by an insider.
15It can easily be shown that in every linear equilibrium, the sequences pn and zn
C
are observationally equivalent.
16Indeed, absent a price change that informed traders cannot anticipate in period
one, it would be suboptimal to establish a position xi1 and already plan to change it
in period two.
17The solution proposed in proposition 6 generalizes Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1986)
(1986). In particular, if τ2 = 0, then φ1 = φ as no new information is released by the
analyst in period two, and thus the ﬁrst period signal has no “added” value.
18In this case the problem is actually worsened by the compound negative eﬀects
that the ﬁrst period signal sale has on ﬁrst and second period proﬁts.
19We can interpret the term (γ/2)ln(τiC2/τC2) as the gross informational advantage
traders have in the second period vis-` a-vis market makers.
20The expression “second-hand” market here is used by way of analogy with the
durable goods monopolist literature. Actually, traders do not resell their signals.
However, we can always interpret the fact that traders are able to use in period two
the signal they acquired in period one, as a second-hand market in which each trader
resells to himself the signal previously acquired.
4821An alternative intuition for this result is the following one. When setting τ∗
1 the
analyst tries to extract as much surplus as possible from traders but at the same time
she also tries to limit the competition she expects to face in the second period owing
to the information traders bought in period one. As a result, she scales down the
quality of the ﬁrst period signal.
22The signal durability here refers to the need that traders have to acquire addi-
tional information over time. To be sure, a fully revealing signal is inﬁnitely durable
(as it kills traders’ need to receive further information in the future), while an in-
ﬁnitely noisy signal is inﬁnitely perishable (as it does not aﬀect traders’ demand for
additional information).
23Therefore, as in the literature on vertical control (Tirole (1988)) – where con-
sumers may face a competitive industry controlled by a monopolistic supplier of the
intermediate good inﬂuencing the price of the ﬁnal good – here we can think of liquid-
ity traders as facing a sector of competitive traders whose behavior is controlled by a
monopolistic supplier of information exerting a (partial) control over market depth.
24A simple intuition for this result – although only partially correct since trading
aggressiveness diﬀer across the equilibria in the two markets – is the following one.
Owing to intertemporal competition, the informativeness of the second period price
induced by the analyst is given by τC2 = 2τC1(τ∗
1) + τ∗
1 while, according to proposi-
tion 5, an insider trades in a way that second period public precision is “only” twice
as high as in the ﬁrst period.
25As noted in proposition 7 in the ﬁrst period the analyst reduces the quality of
the information she sells. It is easy to show that this makes ﬁrst period depth and
price informativeness in the competitive market lower than in the strategic market.
As I will argue in the next section, this result only aﬀects the ﬁrst period: when
N > 2 numerical simulations show that starting from the second round of trade,
49the competitive market is always deeper than the strategic market; furthermore,
price informativeness in the competitive market is always higher than in the strategic
market for all n = 1,2,...N.
26Proposition 11 extends the dynamic equilibrium result in Vives (1995a) to the
case in which traders hold signals of diﬀerent precisions. Its proof is available from
the author upon request.
27This result thus strengthens Admati and Pﬂeiderer’s (1986) conclusion that in a
single period information market vertical diﬀerentiation is never proﬁtable.
28Assuming a richer information structure does not help. For, suppose the analyst
knew v+w with w ∼ N(0,τ−1
w ) and independent from all the other random variables in
the model. Then, ﬁrst period signals would take the form si1 = v+w+i1. The analyst
could therefore disclose the average signal at interim (i.e. ¯ s1 =
R 1
0 si1di = v + w)
without making the equilibrium fully revealing. Such a strategy would, however,
again prevent the sale of any further signal, since si2 = v +w +i2 would be a noisier
signal than the one the analyst disclosed. As a consequence, no trader would be ready
to buy it.
29Notice that this eﬀect reduces the price a trader is willing to pay to buy the ﬁrst
signal.
30See footnote 19.
31The result in proposition 14 is robust to a diﬀerent information structure. As-
suming that traders receive the same signal in every period (with Admati and Pﬂei-
derer’s (1986) terminology, considering the dynamic “newsletters” model) leads ex-
actly to the same conclusion. In this model the case against information disclosure is
even stronger, for the anticipation of a useless ﬁrst period signal in the second period
makes traders unwilling to pay any extra amount in order to buy it. Computations
for this case are available upon request.
5032Keeping the analogy with the durable-goods monopolist literature, publicly dis-
closing a signal is akin to the strategy of an artist who, to convince buyers that
future production will be limited, makes a litograph and destroys the plates (see Bu-
low (1982)). Notice, however, that by doing so the artist does not aﬀect the value
of the durable good. Conversely, as argued above, information disclosure reduces the
value of the “good” the analyst can sell in the future.
33Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and Foster and Viswanathan (1993a) show
that increasing the number of strategic, informed traders accelerates price discovery
in a Kyle (1985) market. However, competition can be dampened both when insiders
hold diﬀerent, correlated signals (Foster and Viswanathan (1996)) and if the coor-
dination properties of public disclosure are exploited (Huddart, Hughes, and Levine
(2005)).
34According to my model, dynamic sales should strengthen this competitive eﬀect,
potentially providing a further reason for information sales to occur. I am grateful to
an anonymous referee for suggesting this interpretation of my analysis.
35Kane and Marks (1990) also compare direct sales of information to the establish-
ment of a mutual fund, proving that the existence of a borrowing constraint makes
the analyst always prefer the former way to deliver information to the latter. In their
framework, however, information sales do not aﬀect the value of the analyst’s signal.
36See Admati (1985), Caball´ e and Krishnan (1994), and Cespa (2004) for static
models of stock markets where traders exchange vectors of assets.
37Owing to the presence of risk-neutral market makers, prices are semi-strong ef-
ﬁcient. Hence, in the second period p2 is suﬃcient for the sequence {p1,p2} in the
estimation of the liquidation value. The dependence of a trader’s strategy on all equi-
librium prices is thus highlighted only to stress the composition of his information
set.
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57Figure 2: Comparing price informativeness with a single, risk-neutral insider (contin-
uous line) and with a monopolistic information seller (dotted line), when τv = τu =
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